Stephens v. State, 279 Ga. 43, 609 S.E.2d 344 (2005). 137, 570 S.E.2d 424 (2002); Herring v. State, 277 Ga. 317, 588 S.E.2d 711 (2003); Thornton v. State, 288 Ga. App. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. 80-122. Johnson v. State, 203 Ga. App. 3d Art. Web(b) If a felon is convicted of a criminal offense other than possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and he or she possessed a firearm in commission of that offense, then the felon shall be penalized for violating this section one (1) class more severely if it is a second or subsequent violation of this section. 16-8-41(a) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under O.C.G.A. 16-11-131, insufficiency in the proof of this element demands entry of a judgment of acquittal as to that offense; thus, since the Court of Appeals determined that the state's evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant was a convicted felon, it was error for that court to remand the case for a hearing on the sole issue of whether the defendant had in fact pled guilty to any prior charges. For article on the 2012 amendment of this Code section, see 29 Ga. St. U.L. KRS Chapter 527. One crime is not "included" in the other and they do not merge. Any offense occurring before July 1, 2012, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior conviction for the purpose of imposing a sentence that provides for a different penalty for a subsequent conviction for the same type of offense, of whatever degree or level, pursuant to this Act.". McKee v. State, 280 Ga. 755, 632 S.E.2d 636 (2006). - Convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault with the intent to rob, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were proper because the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated by the 20-month delay between the date the indictment was issued to the date of the defendant's actual trial as the delay was due to a higher priority of statutory speedy trial demands, so it was not a deliberate delay on the part of the state, and as the defendant failed to show any prejudice from the delay. 248, 651 S.E.2d 174 (2007). - O.C.G.A. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. 5, 670 S.E.2d 824 (2008). 130, 392 S.E.2d 896 (1990). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and felony fleeing or attempting to elude based on the defendant's involvement in a police chase that included speeds in excess of 100 m.p.h. This Code section shall not apply to any person who has been pardoned for the felony by the President of the United States, the State Board of Pardons and Paroles, or the person or agency empowered to grant pardons under the constitutions or laws of the several states or of a foreign nation and, by the terms of the pardon, has expressly been authorized to receive, possess, or transport a firearm.